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1. Bancos Centrais. í. Título. II. Série
The independence of Central Banks: A Crítica!
assessment of the arguments
INTRODUCTION
Ever since Friedman's 1968 paper on the role of mon-
etary policy, criticism of Keynesian policy activlsm has been
mounting, among neoclassical academic economists first, and,
later, also among conservative politicians and businessmen.
Shared by ali of them is the idea that a private market-economy
is intrinsically stable, in the sense that it is capable of reaching
a fulLemployment equilibrium state by itself In modem par-
lance, this kind of economy is supposed to operate, if free of
undue interference, at its natural rate ofunemployment. Private
agents are capable not only of recognizing what is best for each
one of them but also of coordinating thelr plans in such a way
as to make it possible to use available resources in the best way
known. It is furthermore proposed that policy activism cannot
change these plans, because government strategies can be read
through by private agents that move then to neutralize the
measures that could lead them away from their established
goals. Ali the authorities can do is to conHise them for a while,
by sending erratic signals, misleading private agents into devia-
tions from their chosen paths for as long as it takes for them to
realize the mistake and resume their previous course. Thus, it is
said that ali that government can do, after ali, is to generate
oscillations, unable to influence in a durable way the behavior
ofthe economy.2 The best policy strategy, from the point of
^ In fact. ihese inefíiciency-of-policy arguments are generally appiied to
nionetary policy (see, e.g.. Sargent, 1981). For some authors ofthe sanie
yiew of society, would then be to minimize interference, allow-
ing private agents to fínd their way by themselves. Unavoidable
influences of govemment on the economy should be restricted
hy fixed mies, eliminating discretionary intervention.
In spite of its appeal to conservatives, fixed ruies were
never, in fact, implemented. Nevertheless, natural-rate-based
criticisms were strong enough, in the 70s, to put policy-
activists in the defensive and to cause important changes in
the way monetary policy was designed and appiied in the
main capitalist economies of the world.' The most visible
result of the new oríentation was the generaiized adoption of
pre-announced quantitative targets for varíous concepts of
money supply in the mid- to late seventies.
Unexpected changes in money demand and high vola-
tility of interest rates led to an equally generaiized abandon-
ment of these practices in early to mid-eighties, even though
it was often disguised as a pragmatic argument to the need
of considering many indicators and targets for policy formu-
lation.'* After these experiments, monetary policy pretty much
persuasion, the thesis could be appiied aiso to fiscal policy (Barro, 1974).
In faimess, however, it must be recognized that not ali economista who
share the natural rate view accept these resuits (see Lucas, 1981).
' At lhe saine time, although less strongly and less effectively, debates on
the need to adopt mandatory restrictioiis on the generation of public
defícits led to initiatives such as the attempts to impose constitutional
curbs on govemment deficit-spendíng. In this paper, however, we will
limit the discussion to monetary policy matters.
* One of the most interesting sources to follow the argumenta for the
adoption and for the ultiinate abaiidoninent of inonetaiy targets is the
seminar on monetary targeting organized by tiie Federal Reserve Bank of
New York in the early 80s, publislied as Meek (1982). Representatives of
the main Central Banksofthe(then) capitalist world reporttheirexperiences
with the new mies, ali ofthem converging to the need of trying to control
interest rates as a reason for \\\e flexihilizaíion of their policies.
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resumed its past practices, recognizing the possibility of dis-
cretion that is embodied in a situation where the use of vari-
ous indicators prevents the establishment of simple automatic
rules of behavior in accordance to a specified target.
It is in this picture that the proposal of independence
for central banks gathered political and academic momentum
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. In a completely different
argument in comparison to the defense of fixed rules, it was
now stated that monetary authorities, free from the shackles
that connect them to the general govemment, would be able
to pursue their irue goals, that is, price stability. The problem
with monetary policy thus would not be that men in power
in the Central Bank were free to play havoc in money mar-
kets, as before, but that potentially responsible central bank-
ers had too frequently to bend to political pressures that
forced them to deviate from their natural flinction: to defend
the purchasing power of money. To liberate central bankers
would allow them to pursue their natural goal, to fight infla-
tion.
In contrast to the adoption of fixed rules, that were
never seriously considered an alternative of policy, the inde
pendence of central banks had the advantage of seeming
much more politically realistic. When compared to fixed rules
the independence was to be given to exisíing institutions, just
by removing from their charts the provisions that were not
compatible with their "true" nature. Studies were produced
to show that independence, in the degrees one could already
observe in some countries, correlated positively with price
stability, strengthening the argument in its favor. In many
countries, political movements were formed to push the the
sis of independence through the competent political chan-
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nels. The willingness to concede independence to monetaiy
authoríties was transformed into a test of political maturity.
The European Monetary System was designed to include a
strong version of independence.
The theoretical basis for the thesis, however, is much
more íragile and ambiguous than its defenders seem or want
to recognize. Its validity is also much more specific to cer-
tain particular theoretical approaches than those who defend
it on empirical grounds seem either conscious of or willing
to make explicit. In this paper, a critica! view of the indepen
dence proposal is developed. In the next section, we will
discuss the theoretical foundations for the expectation that
independence of the central bank and price stability are two
sides of the same token. Next, we check on the histórica! and
empirical adequacy of the thesis, examining in some detail
how independence is conceived and measured. The section
that follows develops theoretical arguments that would point
to a difiTerent way to consider the role of monetary authori-
ties. Finally, a concluding summary is offered.
2. Independence of the Centra! Bank and Price Stability:
Theoretical Arguments
A common trace in the current flood of papers proposing
independence for central banks (hereafter referred to as ICB)
stands in stark contrast with the rules versus discretion litera-
ture. While the latter was conducted as an essentially theoretical
debate, to be decided on the basis of a rigorous examination of
the properties ofspecified modeis ofthe economy, the literature
supporting central bank independence consists almost entirely
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of empirical propositions períunctorily supported by fragmen-
tary references to theoretical concepts, such as the natural rate
of unemployment and the neutrality of money. This feature is
particularly striking^, since it seems counter-intuitive that the
very same theoretical arguments that were used to support the
adoption of non-discretionary rules of monetary policy appear
now to justify what could be seen as a means to maximize the
discretionary power of the monetary authorities.
In fact, as we will see, the idea of independent central
banks relies on an even more restrictive set of assumptions than
we find in the usual theoretical debates in macroeconomics,
which should explain why some important supporters of rules,
like Milton Friedman, do not seem equally enthusiastic with
respect to the liberation of central bankers. The theoretical
views supporting ICB could be summarized as follows. It is
assumed that private economic agents decide on their strategies
and make their choices by balancing' their individual interests
with the costs their pursuant requires. They are supposed, thus,
to maximize some objective Hinction subjected to perceived
constraints, that represent material limitations to which agents
have to adapt. Private agents are rational, caring only for what
gives them satisfaction. Devoid of any kind of irrational illu-
sions, they seek to amass the greater volume possible of goods
that can satisfy some perceived need.^ Thus, preferences for
goods and services and material constraints that limit the
satisfaction of those preferences, forcing agents to evaluate the
alternativos and choose among them, are the driving forces of
' Cukiennaii, Webb and Neyapti (1992) are more carefiil in presenting
some theoretical arguments in support of their view. Burdekiii and Laney
(1988) also present very briefly their theoretical assumptions.
* Taking need, of course, to be entirely subjective.
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the economy, no matler what kitid ofeconomy are we talking
about. Money is ulíimately just a means to reach desired goals,
not an end in itself. It is a convewence, allowing to trade more
easily and safely, but it does not satisfy consumer demands nor
represents any eífective restriction on choices (since its real
value, that is what matters, is endogenousiy determined). In
sum, only real forces matter, determining the relative prices
that orient individual agents because they concentrate informa-
tion about conditions of trade. Money is neutral because,
ultimately, it changes neither preferences nor possibilities.
The natural rate hypothesis, today associated with Lucas,
IS nothing but the proposition that there is a unique, stable
equihbnum in this kind of economy^, given preferences and
resources, and the proposition that modem capitalist econo-
mies can be adequately represented, in their essentials, by such
a model. If one can accept it, follows that private agents can
only be prevented from reaching such an equilibrium state by
government or any other kind of intervention based on per-
suasion rather than compulsion if they are misinformed or
misled. In any case, wrong information is ultimately dispelled
by experience, dissipating when confronted with reality. Thus,
iu the hng n/n, no interference can be effective if it means
to prevent agents from seeking what corresponds to their
preferences, including the desired allocation of time between
work and leisure that is supposed to determine the natural
rate of unemphyment of labor in this kind ofeconomy.
Panicularly ineífective, to the proponents of the natural
rate hypothesis, is the attempt to use monetary policy to move
'Tlie general equilibrium literatiire is niuch more caulious in making this
kind of statemeni, stressing lhe great number of restrictive assumptions
reqiiired to susiaiii it. See. for inslance. Halm fl984). Natural-rate
inacroeconomists. in this respect, seem toshare the theoretical carelessness
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the economy out of its natural position. As monetary policy
is taken as consisting of changes in the stock of money and
agents cannot be fooled by such manipulations, because money
is just a means of trade and of making calculations, not its
end or substance, only unanticipated variations in the stock
of money that could be misunderstood as a change in the real
conditions of the economy can have real effects. These would
last, however, only until private agents could see what really
happened. Activist monetary policies, therefore, could gener-
ate oscillations around the econoniy's natural position, but
could not change it. A much superior choice for the monetary
authority, from the point of view of society, would be not to
intervene, allowing private agents to settle in their preferred
states.
One could, of course, criticize the reasoning for relying
on too simplistic a view of the monetary policy process as
consisting merely ofmanipulations ofthe money supply. Lucas's
reply to such a question (he attributes to Tobin) is uncom-
promising:
"One wishes to construct a model in which monetaiy
changesare neutral in the senserequiredby the Friedman-Phelps
natiu ali ate hypotheíiis. Accoi dingly, one devises a seíup in which
changes in money ore, in effect, currency reforms (so as not to
clutter up the discussion with the inflationdax issues we ali know
about).Oneendowstheogentsinthismodeleconomy\\'iihenough
sense to see a currency reformfor what it is (or to be free of
"money illusion"). Thesefeatures, if the detailsare worked out
correctly, produce the Friedman-Phelps conclusion [the neutral-
Iheyofteu criticize iiiotherschoolswheiitheysimplytransporíconclusionssupported by special assumptions made in narrowly coiiceived models to
reai-worid ecoiiomies.
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ity ofmoney]/o/ //íí? 7o/(g////i (Lucas, 1981, pp. 561/2)
Let us accept this view, for the moment, for the sake
of the díscussícn. Ali these arguments are, of course, well
known, and were repeatediy used to justify the adoption of
fixed rules for monetary policy as a means to prevent monetary
authorities to try to misinform and mísiead private agents into
choices as work and leisure that are supposed tó go against
t eir own preferences. How could it be used to support what
seems to be precisely the opposite argument, to free monetary
aut orities from externai controls? As a matter of fact, what
seems to be an even earlier question, whom should the central
oank be independem of?
how an independent central bank
^ reconciled with the view that policy discretíon should
^0o / ^hat monetary authoviiies should be
it k inH ̂  It aiso responds the second question:
ohíprtiw ̂  government, with its more general
coak th central banks to sacrifice their own
aeenfia hf^w J seems to be the unavoidable hidden
ITrÍ '« has ,0 assume that
of covernm ^^egedly illegitimate interfcrcnce
sLsr 8°"'^ p"'®
ICB literatnrr^th^^'^^ • ̂  fragility pervading
of money by controIlinJ P"f<=hasing power
assumeftthMc. t ® The central bank is
ers and firme ° objective function much iike consum-
act aSol^^rnV?"'^  that left free to
single-mindediv ^ a central bank will fatally and
section that thk stability. We will see in the nextview is far from being unanimousiy accepted.
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Some would argue that central banks have aIso other goals.
Some would even argue that central banks should have that
singie goal, implying the need for a change in the way the
íiinctions of monetary authorities have been postulated until
now. ICB proponents, however, do not see themselves as
merely doing institutional engineering, by proposing ideal
reforms, but as doing positive economics: they try to show
that the extent to which existing central banks are allowed some
independence corresponds to the amount of effort they put
in pursuing price stability to the detriment of other goals, in
particularly, the increase in employment.» It is not, thus, just
normative economics: they are showing that central banks are
as they assume, not merely that they should be so. Naturally,
if ICB in the end is adopted and this assumption about its
intrisinc nature ultimately proves to be unwarranted, the result
may very well be monetary anarchy.^
There are, in sum, two fundamental theoretical proposi-
tions sustaining ICB: 1. the natural rate hypothesis, in support
of the neutrality of money that removes any possibility for
monetary policy to durably affect real variables in any direc-
tion'®; 2. The assumption that central banks do have a natural
goal, to which they try to adhere as long as they are free to do
it. The first assumption makes activist monetary policy only a
source of nuisance for private agents. The second suggests that
monetary policy is activist only if prodded on by govemment.
" We will see that one of the most important niembers of the ICB group,
Alex Cukiennaii even adopts as a measure of independence the degree to
which central banks accept as a goal to seek price stability and disconsider
employnieni objecti ves. Ofcourse. this collaborates to make the argument
a httle circular: one measures independence by the degree of adherence to
price stability and then correlates the measure of independence with the
observed ratesofinflation! See next section fora more detailed discussion
texto para discussão - iei/ufrj
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3. Independence of the Central Bank and Price Stability:
Empirical Arguments
ICBdefenders seem tobefully consciousofthe theoreti-
cal fragility of their arguments. In fact, much more effort is
dedicatedin this literature to the empirical search ofsignificant
correlation between measuresofindependence ofthe monetary
authority and the observed degree ofprice stability.!! It be-
comesa matter of“applied economics”,orsois desired by them
in an apparentattemptto considerthe sole duty ofa central bank
to fight inflation as an axiom,as a self-evident proposition.
Even as an empirical proposition, however, it should be
taken with somereservations.!? Firstly, because independence
ofthe central bankis a difficult idea to conceive and even more
to measure in any way. Ofcourse, the monetary authority has
 
° Goodhart (1994) remindsus of such a possibility offering the example
ofpost-communist Russia. Friedmanseemed to share the fears that such
a situation might emerge. (Cf. Friedman, 1962, as quoted by Burdekin and
Laney, 1988). In fact, we should asks ourselves whether the ICB view is
tenable in the face ofpublic choice theory that is accepted by so many of
these authors. Why should we expect that independent central bankers
would reallyact to sustain price stability, as suggested by Haan and Sturm
(1992), instead ofadopting other policies to increase theirpower,influence
oreven pecuniary rewards? Fora discussionofthe public choice perspective
as applied to ICB,see Willet and Keen (1990).
"One cannot expand output and employment with monetary policy but
also restrictive monetary policies cannot have durable contractionary
effects on them.
" Muchless attentionis givento the correlation between independence of
the central bank andreal variables, such as employmentand growth. To
See one ofthese fewerattempts that finds that central bank independence
“has no measurable impact on real economic performance”, see Alesina
and Summers,(1993). Haan and Sturm (1992)were also unableto find any
Significant correlation between them.
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to be accountable to someone. Ifnot the government, whom to?
Also, there has to be some procedureto chooseits governor and
board ofdirectors andto set its operating rules. There may be
somewayto removethe governorin case ofneed. Its resources
must be provided somehow and the central bank must be
accountableforits use (whichis something different from being
accountable forits decisions, which was mentioned above). In
other words, what does it mean to be independent?
Most of the time, ICB proponents want to make it
independentofthe central government. But eventhis is not as
devoid ofambiguity as one should wish. The monetary author-
ity may be independentin the sensethat it is not required to
sacrifice monetary policy goals to compulsorily accommodate
fiscal policy decisions. This sense of independenceis generally
acceptable.In fact, it only meansthatthere are limits to the use
of monetary instruments (as there are limits to the use of
instruments of any nature) to preserve monetary institutions
andpractices. Another, and much narrower, sense of indepen-
dence requires that the central bank maybe able to implement
monetary policiesin a direction contrary to that decided by the
central government. In this sense, independence means to
decide on monetary policy without any consideration for an
eventually opposite choice madeby the central governmentas
to, for instance,its fiscal, commercial, exchangerate policies,
" Basedasit is onthe natural rate hypothesis, the ICB thesis would,at best,
be as valid as the NRH. The empiricalliterature on the latter is vast and
it would be an euphemismto saythatthe evidenceis not entirely favorable
to NRH.See,for instance, De Long and Summers (1988). Of course, even
ifthe NRHwasshownto survive empiricaltests, ICB couldstill be proved
false as it results fromfurther restrictions placed upon NRHthat could
themselves be proved false.
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etc. This meaning of independence, lhat is clearly implied in
most of ÍCB literature that intends to isolate the search for price
stability as a task for monetary authorities no matter which
policy the central government may be foliowing, is much íess
acceptable.'^
Be it as it may, the ICB thesis is that central banks must
be continuously trying to act towards price stabiíization, be-
cause this is supposed to be its nature, just to be restrained by
outside interference, niainly from the government, that would
stress other goals, such as expanding employment. To this
literature, this is not just a conflict between alternativo goals.
Government' s attempts to expand and sustain high employment
are clearly ic/o/zg, since any employment target that is actually
achievable will be attained without the help of policy, since the
private economy tends to reach its natural position anyway.
Why then do governments try to increase employment? There
are two possible answers to this question. The first one is that
governments just do not understand how the economy works.
Ofcourse, this answer is hardly acceptable. Why should every-
body else in the economy be able to make their decisions based
on the correct model of the economy except the government?
The second answer is more coherent; even with rational expec-
tations it is acknowledged that there is a possibility of influenc-
ing employment in the short run, by surprising private agents
with non-anticipate.d changes in the money supply. This, of
course, is supposed to play havoc in the monetary system in the
mid to long-run. Governments, however, have short-run hori-
zons, since mandates are limited. They stress results that are
closer in time in detriment ofprice stability that offers long-term
&
Cukiennaii, Webb and Neyapti (1992) e ven iransfonn disregard ofotlier
policy objeclives into a test of independence.
benefits. Central banks are supposed to have opposite prefer-
ences, stressing the long-term gains associated with stability.
The longer a mandate for monetary authorities is conceded the
more they will be able to implement strategies that reflect their
preference for price stability.''*
This seems to be the main rationale for the particular way
in which the ICB literature seems to conceive of independence
and how to measure it. As Eijífmger and Schalling (1993)'5
show, the most common way to assess the degree of indepen
dence enjoyed by specific national institutions is by examining
the way the board of governors of each central bank is chosen,
how long their mandate lasts and which are the formal channels
of contact, if any, between the monetary authority^-and the
government. Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) take a step
further including in their measurement not only the formal
mandate of governors but also their actua! duration, as an
indication of independence.
As pointed out by Grossman, altliougli witij respect Io lhe defense of
aulonialic rules, in the view of those wiio what to isolate monetary pol ícy,
"[t]he most basic problem ... seems to be the inherent weakiiess of politics
as a process for maklng economic decisions. Experience suggests tliat the
política! process has limited abiliiy to specify consisleiit goals. establish
priorities, and choose between competingobjectivesabouteconomicmatlers,
especiallywhenthese decisions requirecomprehension ofcomplex technical
issuesaiid constant processing ofcomplex infonnation." (Grossman, 1981,
p. 8).
Tliis very useftjl papersummarizes the meihods and findingsofthe most
influential works on tlie theme in recent years, by Bade and Parkin, Alesina
and Grilii.MasciandaroandTabeliini.whiledevelopinganaJtemative along
tiie same general lines. Tlie paper is also use fui for providing excerpts of the
charts of central banks of fwelve countries relafed to their goals, choice of
goveniorsand mechanisms for lhe solutionofconflictsbetweenthe monetary
authority aiid the central government. Haan and Stumi (1992) is another
attempt to measure independence through fonnal niles of control.
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These índices are admittediy fragile. Formal rufes re-
tlecl vety poorly the actual mechanisms through which power
is exercised. It does not consider more complex and effective
laclors hlce política! consensus formation, lhat may be so
important to differentiate the cases of the United States and
apan. The nature of politics and economic policy decision-
making is completely dlRerent In countries such as Germany,
rance or Japan, with a tradition of centralization and politi-
cal consensus. and England or the United States. where
I  strong and vocal. The actual substance
cnntp rules can be completely dilTerent in each
Webb and Neyapti. for instance.
ST' 'rfT." 
As the authors state, even being formally independent, the
Fed is still a part of govemment, not a power of its own.'«
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (1992) tried to go beyond
the iiinítations of gíving ali attentíon to formal rules by comple-
menting the studies of choice and mandate of govemors with a
qualitative examination (based on questionnaires filled by spe-
cialists) and aiso by identifying the stated goals of monetary
authoríties. The qualitative evidence could be promising although
not enoügh infomiation is given as to its nature in the paper.
The other source, the goals of central banks, involves an obvi-
ous circularity. An independent central bank xsposUihíed ?ls one
that prefers price stability to increasing employment, that uses
quantitative targets for monetaiy aggregates instead of interest
rate targets, etc. These measures of independence are only ac-
ceptable if one previousiy agree with the theoretical principies
on which the thesis of correlation between independence and
price stability are based. Of course, if one defends that priority
to price stability is a measure of independence and then corre
lates this measure of independence with price stability, one should
not be surprised to find some correlation.
As a matter of fact, it may be surprising that the correla
tion fbund by Cukierman in bis 1992 book, that seems to be an
elaboration of previous studies, including the one with Webb
and Neyapti, is not stronger. As stated by Goodhart, a critic
generally sympathetic to the proposal of independence, in his
review of the book (Goodhart, 1994), "lhe empiríca! relaíion-
ships exhihiieJ [between Cukieíwcai \s independence índices and
inflaíion] ... strike me as rather weak. " (pp.l 11/2)
In sum, both as a theoretical and as an empirical propo-
sition the connection between independence of the central bank
On íhe same vein. see aIso Pierce (1990).
18 íe.xto para discussão iei/ufrj
and price stability seems to be very weak, dependent on very
strong and narrow views of how the economy works and
what central banks do. This does not mean, on the other
hand, that no improvements cannot be made in the way
monetary authoríties are nowadays expected to act. In any
case, a different conception of how a modem market economy
works leads to a very different program for monetary policy.
In the next section we try to outline something of this pro
gram.
•/. A Keynesian Critique of the ICB Thesis
The central argument behind both the proposal of fixed
rules and of independence of the central bank is the natural
rate of unemployment hypothesis. As we saw, it means that
monetary policy cannot contributo to increase employment
permanentiy and, which is, of course, the other side of lhe
same point, that the pursuance of price stability through
monetary restriction will not lead to persistem unemploy
ment. Money is, thus, neutral: it neither contributos to in
crease or to decrease employment, with the possible excep-
tion of very short, transitional periods. This is certainly the
bone of contention between monetarists (Friedmanian or new
classical) and Keynesians (possibly most of neoclassical synthe-
sis'9, new Keynesians and post Keynesians).
Keynesian monetary theory relies on the non-neutrality of
money. This is not the placo to discuss which particular ratio-
There are exceptions, the inost noted of which is perhaps Roberi J.
Gordoii who accepted the NRH. See, for instance, Gordon (1990).
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nale for money's non-neutrality should be consídered more
faithíljl to Keynes s original ideas. In fact, there are many
possibilities to establish the point. Hahn's multiple equilibria
(Hahn, 1983) as well as Clower's dual decision hypothesis
(Clower, 1965) define niodels in which multiple equilibrium
positions exist and monetary policy can be an instrument to
determine which one is actually achieved.^'' AJternatively, one
can consider models in which money affects the choice of assets
that determine growth paths or long-period equilibrium posi
tions. We count here Tobin's model of growth with a monetary
asset (Tobin, 1987) as well as Keynes^s own General ll^eory
(chapter 17). We could even think of models that accept the
natural rate hypothesis in the way it is conceived by monetarists
and argue, as Gordon (1990), that, in practice, that one cannot
just wait for economic processes to unfold, so policy should be
designed to accelerate the adjustment processes.^'
When preparing The General Theory, Keynes took his
distances from the models in which "Money... is employed, but
is treated as being in some sense neuirar (Keynes, 1973a, p.
We inay thiiik of multiple Wairasiaii equilibria, where money is iieulral
aiiyway or conceive of non-Walrasian equilibria. If there are multiple
equilibria of tlie latter type, one should think of multiple natural rates of
unemployment. In adifferent spirit, see Kregel (1984/5) criticism ofthe
assumption of unique natural rates, based on Sraffa (1932).
Arguments like Gordoifs reminds us ofthe old debate around the Pigou
effect that led to lhe same conclusion: in theoiy, ftill-einployinent
equilibrium should aiways be within reach, conirary to what Keynes
expected, but in practice something had to be done to accelerate the
process. Friedniaji calculated that full adjustment to monetary changes
could take decades (Friedinan, 1989). Tobin replied that with these lags
he would be very much satisfíed to acl in-between (Tobin and BiiitPr
1976). '
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408, his emphasis). He went on to state:
"The theory which /desiderate woidddea!, in coníradis-
tincíion to this, with an economy in which money plays a part
ofits own and affects motives and decisions and is, in short, one
of the operative factors in the situation, so that the course of
events cannot be predicted, either in the longperiodor in the
short, without a knowfedge of the behaviour of money between
the first state and the last. And it is this which we oiight to mean
when we speak of a monetary economy." (id., pp. 408/9, his
emphasis)22
According to Keynes, it was non-measurable uncertainty
that conferred to money special properties as a general form of
wealth (Keynes, 1979, pp. 108ss). As a result, "On my view,
there is no unique long-periodposition ofequiitbnum equally
valid regardiess of the character of the policy of the monetary
authority. " (Keynes, 1979, p. 55)
One cannot develop here this view to show it can base a
ílill-fledged modeP^ Nor can we compare it with the other
versions ofKeynesian economics that share, in some degree, the
postulate of non-neutrality of money. Sufftce to say at this point
that reílising the natural rate hypothesis implies to recognize
durable real effects of monetaiy policy. This puts other chal-
lenges to the monetary authority than just seeking price stabil-
ity. As cogently put by Samuelson recently:
"Leaningagainst the windof inflationary overheating is
" Keynes added later: "Tlie idea that it is comparaiively easy to adapt the
hypothetical conclusions ofa real wage [neulral money] economics to lhe
real world of monetary economics is a mistake." (id., p. 410)
Post Keynesian economics is an attempt to develop these views into a
formal model. See, for instance. Davidson (1978), Minsky (1986), Kregel
(1980). Tliis author's own attempts are in Carvalho (1992).
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a viía! dníy of lhe Federa! Reserve as a centra! bank. // goes
ahng with lhe Fed 's viía! dníy ío !ean againsí íhe winds ofse!f-
aggiavaíing recession. " (Samuelson, 1993, p. 22)2^
Under the condítíons of these models, policy activísm
in general is justifled and monetary policy, in particular, is
conceived as part and parcel of the tool box at the disposi-
tion of government to seek for its goals. As Vicarelli (1988)
pointed out, conflict between institutions (such as the central
pvernment and the central bank) are signs of inefíiciencies
in the decision-niaking process rather than healthy signs of
independence of the monetary authority.
One should notice that these views do not favor the
snbordinaíion of monetary policy to other policies, in par
ticular fiscal policy. The preservation of an orderly monetary
and financial system defines limits and constraints on the use
of monetary instruments, much in the same way as limits are
aiso placed on the use of other instruments. Monetary policy
has, however, to be coordinaíed with other policies to maxi
mize the efficiency of policy-making in general. Once one
refuses the natural rate hypothesis, one cannot see any sense
in the proposal of independence of the central bank to set its
own goals and to pursue them as it feels fit.
- Even more forceftilly Saniuelsoii added: "Tlie Buiidesbaiik notion that
.ts ̂  concern ,s pr.ce levei stability and that it is an independem fourtl
estate ofíioveniinent has spread much inischief. around tli^wo^d an^
Gennany itself." (Samuelson. 1993, p. 23) '
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3. Condusion
Modem central banks were created or had its behavior
changed to help the management ofmonetary systems that were
to a bigger or lesser extent freed from the shackles of the gold
standard. Modem monetary institutions were devised to allow
money and credit to be more elastic than they were in the
previous standards, so as to accommodate the needs of trade.
The Federal Reserve System even had this goal put at the
Preamble of its chart (Eijffinger and Schalling, 1993, p. 83).
As the economy evolves, so do its institutions. No one
doubts that monetary institutions have to be adapted to the new
times. Few would doubt that means have to be found to increase
the discipline of the money and financial markets since a
reasonable case can be made in favor of the idea that monetary
policies havebeen too permissive ofinflation. In particular, the
relationship between fiscal and monetary policies have most
probably to be redesigned, although the idea that ali the
problems reside there is more a result of the assumption that
private markets are never the source of troubles than of crude
facts.25
Keynesians are inclined to propose that monetary policy
should be put at the same foot as fiscal or other policies, not a
lower one. The notion of a independent central bank, on the
other hand, is a very peculiar result of veiy restrictive assump-
tions.
Keynesians have einphasized lhe iinportance ofconflicts between labor
and fínns as an inflationary source, demanding some kind of pennanent
incomes policy (e.g., Weintraub. 1978). Circuit theorists emphasize the
relation between the monetary authority and private agents rather than
with fiscal authorities as detennining the behavior of the money supply
(e.g., Graziani, 1990).
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